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Introduction
Governments do not design monetary policies directly in industrialized countries: central banks do. Governments may, however, influence monetary policies indirectly by, for example, appointing politically aligned members to the central bank council or signaling preferred policies (e.g., Havrilesky 1988 Havrilesky , 1991 Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Chappell et al. 1993; Chang 2001; Hayo and Hefeker 2002; Schnakenberg et al. 2017) . The more the central bank depends on the directives of the government, the more clearly politicians might matter. Scholars have examined for a long time whether government ideology influences monetary policies. The hypothesis to be tested empirically is that leftwing governments implement more expansionary monetary policies, such as lower interest rates and faster monetary base growth than rightwing governments (on the partisan theories see Hibbs 1977; Chappell and Keech 1986; Alesina 1987 and Potrafke 2017, 2018 for surveys). The empirical evidence is mixed. 1 We revisit the conclusions of previous studies, especially panel data studies for OECD countries, highlighting the importance of differences across time periods and country-specific factors for inferences. First, the relationship between government ideology and monetary policy has varied greatly over time, often because of structural changes in the global economic environment. Our findings suggest that monetary policy indeed was influenced by government ideology in the 1990s. During other decades, however, government ideology does not appear to matter. Such heterogeneities often are masked in cross-country panel analyses that attempt to estimate stable relationships over several decades. Second, a great deal of heterogeneity exists across countries. Some countries, such as Greece and Germany, appear to have implemented politically motivated monetary policies. Ideology-induced monetary policies in many other countries may be masked by the fact that governments had limited opportunities to adopt discretionary policies. Rather, they often just followed a leader by, for example, pegging their exchange rates to that of an influential neighboring country (most prominently the German Deutschmark). External factors -e.g., the need to comply with the European Exchange Rate Mechanism or International Monetary Fund programs -often limited the scope for discretionary monetary policies. Third, scholars disagree about whether the short-term interest rate or money growth rates is a better measure of the expansiveness of monetary policy (Vaubel 1993; Belke and Potrafke 2012) . Our results also suggest that inferences are sensitive to the dependent variable used.
A prominent research design has been estimating the long-term relationship between government ideology and interest rates in a Taylor rule framework. The baseline model uses nominal interest rates as the dependent variable and the inflation rate and output gap as explanatory variables (Taylor 1993) . 2 The model is extended by a government ideology variable, as well as its interaction with measures of central bank independence. Using quarterly data for 23 OECD countries over the 1980.1-2005.4 period, Belke and Potrafke (2012) show that interest rates were somewhat lower under leftwing than rightwing governments when central bank independence was weak. By contrast, interest rates were higher under leftwing governments than rightwing governments when central bank independence was strong. The authors conjectured that the "findings are compatible with the view that leftist governments, in an attempt to deflect blame [from] their traditional constituencies, have pushed market-oriented policies by delegating monetary policy to conservative central bankers" (p. 1126). Giesenow and de Haan (2019) propose two innovations. First, they emphasize that central banks are forward-looking and, hence, model central bank behavior using forward-looking and real-time data. Second, they use a combination of: mean group estimators, which pin down the long-term coefficient of interest by estimating separate slope coefficients for each country, then taking the mean; and pooled-mean group estimators, which assume a common long-run coefficient, allowing short-run coefficients to vary across countries (Pesaran et al. 1999) . The focus thus remains on the long-run relationship between government ideology and interest rates. In contrast with Belke and Potrafke (2012) , they find that government ideology does not appear to matter. We corroborate the lack of a long-term relationship. Heterogeneities along several dimensions, however, may be hidden, which is what we investigate here.
The notion of the "impossible trinity" describes how in open economies national governments can achieve only two objectives out of the triplet of monetary independence, exchange rate stability, and free capital movements. Beckmann et al. (2017) Conrad and Hartmann (2019) . 3 On ideology-induced exchange rate policies, see also Berdiev et al. (2012 Table A1 shows descriptive statistics and data sources for all variables used in the analysis.
The mean levels of the short-term nominal interest rate over the entire sample period were 8.83% under leftwing, 10.12% under center and 8.84% under rightwing governments (Table 1 ). The government ideology variable is from Potrafke (2009) . Following the classification of Budge et al. (1993) , the variable takes on the values 1 and 2 for rightwing governments, 3 for center governments, and 4 and 5 for leftwing governments. The coding is consistent across time, but does not capture differences between the party-families across countries. [ Table 2] [ Table 3] The GDP-adjusted monetary expansion was around 1.8 percentage points smaller under leftwing than rightwing governments over the 1972-1979 period (Table 3 ). In the 1980s, the difference grows to 2.35 percentage points, before decreasing again during the 1990s, when the monetary expansion measure was quite similar under leftwing and rightwing governments.
During the early 2000s, GDP-adjusted monetary expansion is roughly the same under leftwing and rightwing governments. None of the differences for the considered sub-periods are statistically significant.
Clearly, the unconditional correlations between government ideology and the interest rate or the monetary expansion measures are quite likely to be confounded by other factors. We next investigate the relationship in a regression framework based on the Taylor rule in Section 2.2.
Regression results
Following previous studies, we estimate panel data models using the short-term nominal interest rate (irs) as the dependent variable (Taylor rule). We also estimate the model using the monetary expansion (M1) rate minus trend growth of real GDP as the dependent variable (expansion). As explanatory variables, we include the inflation rate (CPI), the output gap (gap),
and country and year-by-quarter fixed effects. We add Potrafke's (2009) central banks are forward-looking and it would be preferable to model central bank behavior using forward-looking and real-time data (Giesenow and de Haan 2019) . Unfortunately, these data are not available until relatively recently (1989 for most countries in the sample). We need data from the 1970s for our purposes. Table 4 reports the regression results for the Taylor-rule specification for the full sample and individual decades. During the 1970s and the 2000s, the central bank independence measure hardly changed, so we do not estimate CBD or its interactions -they are absorbed by the country fixed effects. Similarly, no peg hardly changed at all during the 2000s. The coefficient estimates for the inflation rate, the output gap and the lagged dependent variable display the expected sign and are statistically significant in all seven specifications (the exception is the output gap in columns 2 and 6). As theory predicts, the inflation rate and the output gap are positively correlated with the nominal interest rate. 9 The lagged dependent variable is statistically significant at the 1% level with a coefficient estimate of around 0.67 to 0.81, indicating that interest rates are highly persistent.
Government ideology enters in up to four explanatory variables: the government ideology ideo, as such, the double interaction terms ideo*CBD and ideo*no peg, and the triple interaction term ideo*CBD*no peg. In column (4), for example, the government ideology variable has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level, the interaction term ideo*no peg has a positive sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level, the interaction terms ideo*CBD and ideo*CBD*no peg have negative signs, but lack statistical significance.
In column (7), by contrast, the four variables including government ideology lack statistical significance. To evaluate the effect of government ideology on the short-term nominal interest rates, the individual coefficient estimates are not useful for interpretation. Since we expect 8 Focusing on the iteration (b) the procedure proposed by Kiviet and Bun (2001) is implemented as follows: Upon obtaining initial LSDVC estimates for the parameters and the variance of the disturbance term ( ) the routine calculates the N-vector of fixed effect estimates. Then it obtains bootstrap errors ( ) as a draw from N (0, ). Then it obtains a bootstrap sample from . Using the resampled dataset, it applies LSDVC to ( ( ) , ) to yield ( ) and ( ) . 9 The long-run effects of the inflation rate and the output gap are determined by dividing the individual coefficient estimates in Table 4 by one minus the coefficient estimate of the lagged dependent variable. In column (7), for example, the long-run effects of the inflation rate and the output gap are 0.25/(1-0.81) = 1.32 and 0.11/(1-0.81) = 0.58 (the Taylor-rule predicts effects of 2 and 0.5). government ideology and the short-term nominal interest rate to be related only under certain exchange rate regimes and levels of central bank dependence, we need to compute marginal effects for the government ideology variable, conditional on these factors. Where possible, we compute marginal effects of government ideology conditional on flexible exchange rates (no peg) and the degree of central bank dependence.
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The marginal effects do not suggest that government ideology was correlated with shortterm nominal interest rates over the 1972-2010 period for any level of central bank independence (column 7). They do however suggest that, depending on the level of central bank independence and under flexible exchange rates, government ideology was correlated with short-term nominal interest rates over the 1990-2010 period (column 4), especially so during the 1990s (column 5). That is, the marginal effects in columns 4 and 5 indicate that, when central bank independence was strong and exchange rates were flexible, leftwing governments presided over higher interest rates than rightwing governments. The finding of higher interest rates under leftwing than rightwing governments contradicts partisan theories, which predict lower interest rates under leftwing governments. For the two decades from 1990 to 2010, at minimum central bank dependence, an increase in the government ideology variable by one point -moving, for example, from a center government to a leftwing government -increases the short-term nominal interest rate by 0.24 percentage points (short-run effect). These results are in line with those of Belke and Potrafke (2012) , whose analysis covers the 1980-2005 period, and are consistent with the idea that leftwing governments outsource monetary policy to conservative central bankers. On the other hand, when central banks are dependent, the results in column 5 for the 1990s suggest that leftwing governments had lower interest rates than rightwing governments -a result that corroborates the partisan theory, the predictions of which are expected to be more pronounced when central banks are dependent. At the maximum of CBD, a one-point increase in the ideology variable reduces interest rates by 0.23 percentage points.
[ Table 4] We also use monetary expansion minus GDP trend growth as the dependent variable (Table 5 ). The results do not suggest that government ideology (conditional on flexible exchange rates and any degree of central bank dependence) was correlated with monetary expansion minus GDP trend growth. Owing to a lack of variation in the CBD variable and the 10 The marginal effects are computed in terms of combinations of the estimated coefficients and standard errors (delta method). For example, the marginal effect of government ideology at the maximum of central bank dependence when exchange rates are flexible is ̂+ ( ̂+ ) * max + , using the coefficient estimates from the model. exchange rate dummy, we cannot estimate triple interactions in columns 2, 5 and 6. Because changing the dependent variable implies a change in the sample, we also have estimated the Taylor rule using the short-term interest rate as dependent variable on the smaller sample for which data on monetary expansion minus GDP trend growth is available (i.e., Table 5 ). The results confirm the finding in Table 4 , column 4, of a statistically significant relationship between government ideology and interest rates for the 1990-2010 period (results not shown).
In particular, at the minimum of CBD and under flexible exchange rates, a one-point increase in the government ideology variable is associated with an increase in interest rates by 0.17 percentage points, which is close to the increase of 0.24 percentage points from Table 4 , column 4.
[ Table 5 ]
We have conducted jackknife tests excluding individual countries. The results do not suggest that the inferences are driven by including/excluding an individual country.
Overall, the regression results suggest that the considered time period and the exchange rate regime/central bank dependence of the countries in the sample matter for drawing conclusions when examining the relationship between government ideology and monetary policy, as does the choice of how we measure the looseness or tightness of that policy. Although we do not make any causal claims, the findings support the need for a more detailed survey at the individual country level when correlations are so clearly driven by the chosen sample. We discuss monetary policies in four selected countries in the next section.
Monetary policies in individual countries
We survey the evidence on Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United States. Those countries are chosen because they present good examples of historical episodes in which monetary policies clearly were or were not ideology-induced. 
The Netherlands
Monetary policies in the Netherlands were unlikely to be ideology-induced, even though a large negative left-right interest rate differential is observed: Figure 2 shows that short-term nominal interest rates were 3.54% under leftwing, 7.95% under center and 6.93% under rightwing governments over the 1980-1998 period. The differences between leftwing and center or rightwing governments are statistically significant at the 1% level, perhaps suggesting that government ideology may have played an important role consistent with the partisan theories.
However, the Netherlands has for the most part pegged its currency to the Deutschmark, Netherlands participated in the EMS over the 1979-1998 period and the EMU from January 1999. The objective of the Nederlandsche Bank over that period was to "regulate the value of the guilder in order to enhance welfare" (Dutch Bank Law, section 9.1), interpreted as maintaining "a stable exchange rate for the guilder vis-á-vis the deutsche mark" (Eijffinger and de Haan 1996, p. 16).
11 Over the 1994-2000 period, Greece had the largest reductions in interest rates observed in our sample. It is true that rightwing governments were quite active in liberalizing the capital accounts: "the de Jong cabinet from 1967 to 1971 was the first real center-right coalition of the modern (secular) party system, and during its first 7 months in office, the government enacted more liberalizations than the previous four governments had enacted in the 5 years prior; by the end of the first year, banks had unlimited access to foreign money markets" ( At the beginning of the 1970s, the policy goals of a fixed exchange rate for the krona, low inflation and low interest rates dominated. The Riksbank acted as an extended arm of the government and "monetary policy became an integral part of overall allocative and distributional policies" (Jonung 1993, p. 348) . During the 1970s, the Keynesian view gradually was undermined when the expansive fiscal policy of "bridging-over" gave rise to a large budget 
United States
The appointment process of the seven appointed Board of Governors (BOG) members has been described as being driven by political preferences. However, candidates nominated by the US president must be confirmed by the US Senate, so partisan control of the Senate is a major consideration (Chang 2001) . Members of the Senate, especially the members of the Senate (and House) Banking Committee have lobbied for monetary policies in line with their political preferences (Grier 1991 (Grier , 1996 Chopin et al. 1996a b; Hess and Shelton 2016) .
The Federal Open Market Committee's (FOMC) members' voting behavior on setting the Federal Funds rate used to depend on whether they were appointed by Democratic or Republican administrations (early relevant studies include Chappell et al. 1993; McGregor 1996) . Members appointed by Republican administrations were more likely to advocate federal funds rates above the "optimal" rate determined by the Taylor 
Monetary base growth has been shown to be higher under Democratic governments than
Republican governments (Hibbs 1986 (Hibbs , 1987 Havrilesky 1987; Faust and Irons 1999) . The extent to which interest rates were lower under Democratic than Republican governments is, however, controversial (Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Alesina et al. 1997; Chen and Wang 2013; Blinder and Watson 2016) .
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Federal Reserve has at times been subjected to political (Weintraub 1978; Bartels 1985) . Those requirements later were included in the Federal Reserve Act in 1977, which linked the Fed's monetary policies to the president's economic projections. While the Fed's independence remained for the most part intact, it now had to provide Congress with its monetary policy objectives ahead of time, and the following years "were ones of an acquiescent Fed" (Bartels 1985, p. 38) . From late 1976 until late 1979, the Fed's stance appeared to accommodate political desires for low interest rates and strong growth, despite increasing inflation.
Some individual chairs of the Fed enjoy a reasonable degree of power and autonomy from the administration that appointed them. An example is Paul Volcker, appointed to the Fed in August 1979, who played a major role in reasserting the autonomy of the Fed and changing its policy strategy. He believed that the Fed "had been too acquiescent to presidents in the past" (Bartels 1985, p. 38) . He was known for hawkish views by the Carter administration, but Carter appointed him anyway, and the appointment enjoyed support across the political spectrum (Lindsey et al. 2013) . The "Volcker Revolution" of 1979, the "most fundamental change in monetary policy in recent memory" (Taylor 2017a ) was undertaken without seeking White House approval. When tightening was required prior to the 1980 presidential election, the Fed came under sharp criticism from the Carter administration.
The ideological leanings of other Fed Chairs have been a topic of much discussion, as well.
Their views certainly can be identified to some degree, though the extent to which those views impacted policy is debatable. Alan Greenspan, considered to be a conservative Republican, was appointed by President Reagan and reappointed by Clinton. Mankiw (2002, p. 39) notes that "it would have been natural for Clinton to want to put a more Democratic stamp on the nation's central bank. That he chose not to do so is notable. To the extent that Greenspan's Fed has been a success, the Clinton administration deserves some of the credit." Mankiw (2002, p. 40) Our results do not suggest that government ideology was associated with monetary policies over the full 1972-2010 sample period, supporting conclusions by Giesenow and de Haan (2019) . Monetary policies were, however, more expansionary under leftwing than rightwing governments in the 1990s: short-term nominal interest rates were lower under leftwing than rightwing governments when central banks followed the central governments' directives and exchange rate were flexible. Very independent central banks, however, increased interest rates when leftwing governments were in office, corroborating the previous study by Belke and Potrafke (2012) .
Differences likewise emerge across nations that are important to consider before drawing conclusions from the cross-country studies. Greece is a prime example of a country that appeared to exhibit ideology-induced monetary policies in the 1980s and the early 1990s.
In contrast, in Sweden, monetary policies were quite restrictive under leftwing governments.
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